Kawsar Mia and Abdul Momen
Bangladesh should stop treating foreign policy as a choice between rival camps. A more durable strategy is to build a diversified portfolio of partnerships, using different countries for trade, technology, connectivity, labour mobility and finance, while keeping strategic dependence on any single power to a minimum.
Foreign Policy Should Be a Portfolio, Not a Camp
One of the most persistent questions in Bangladesh’s foreign policy is whether Dhaka should lean toward India, China, the United States, or another major power. That framing is increasingly unhelpful. Modern diplomacy is not a loyalty test. States cooperate with different partners for different purposes, and the most resilient foreign policies are built around interests rather than permanent alignment.
Bangladesh should therefore think of foreign policy as a portfolio. One partner may matter most for geography and connectivity, another for technology, another for export markets, another for development finance, and another for labour mobility. The objective is not to keep every relationship equally warm. It is to ensure that no single external actor becomes indispensable across too many sectors at once.
This approach has become more urgent in 2026. Bangladesh is entering a period of trade adjustment, new bilateral agreements and uncertainty around its graduation from least-developed-country status. The country is scheduled to graduate from the LDC category on 24 November 2026, although the United Nations has noted an official request for an extension of the preparatory period. Whatever the final decision, Bangladesh needs a foreign policy that supports a more competitive and diversified economy rather than one that is organised around geopolitical camps.
India: Geography Requires Practical Cooperation
India will remain one of Bangladesh’s most important relationships because geography cannot be diversified away. The two countries share rivers, a long border, transport links, energy connections and an increasingly dense network of commercial and security interests. For Bangladesh, the sensible question is not whether India should be treated as a friend or a rival. It is whether each area of cooperation produces measurable and reciprocal results.
Dhaka should prioritise shared-river management, border stability, electricity and energy trade, rail and waterway connectivity, access to Nepal and Bhutan, smoother travel for medical and educational purposes, and better market access for Bangladeshi products. The relationship should be institutional rather than personality-driven. Agreements that survive changes of government are more valuable than diplomatic warmth that depends on particular political leaders.
Japan and South Korea: Build Capability, Not Dependence
Japan is already a major development and infrastructure partner, but 2026 has created an opportunity to move the relationship further. On 6 February, Japan and Bangladesh signed the Japan – Bangladesh Economic Partnership Agreement, Bangladesh’s first EPA. The agreement covers not only tariffs but also investment, services, e-commerce, intellectual property, customs procedures and trade facilitation. That gives Dhaka a platform to pursue technology transfer, higher-quality manufacturing, engineering education, healthcare, renewable energy and skilled-worker mobility rather than viewing Japan mainly as a source of infrastructure finance.
South Korea offers a similar opportunity. Bangladesh’s relationship with Seoul should move beyond labour recruitment toward industrial capability. Joint training in electronics, shipbuilding, batteries, automated production, information technology and technical education could help Bangladesh move into more sophisticated supply chains. The strategic objective in both relationships should be the same: use external partnerships to build domestic capability rather than permanent dependence on imported expertise.
Europe: Prepare for a Post-LDC Trade Environment
The European Union remains central to Bangladesh’s export economy. In 2025, the EU accounted for 21.5 percent of Bangladesh’s total goods trade with the world, and textiles made up almost 94 percent of the EU’s imports from Bangladesh. That concentration has been valuable, but it also exposes the limits of a foreign policy focused mainly on market access for garments.
Bangladesh needs a wider European strategy covering green industry, product standards, traceability, labour rights, research, higher education, climate adaptation, water management and advanced manufacturing. Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy and the Nordic countries each offer different areas of cooperation. The goal should be to move from being primarily a low-cost supplier toward becoming a partner in design, technology, research and higher-value production.
The policy challenge is especially important because Bangladesh’s LDC transition will eventually change the trade environment. Diplomacy should therefore help firms meet new sustainability and regulatory standards before preferences erode, not after.
The United States: Trade Is Now a Harder Bargain
Relations with the United States also need to be understood in economic as well as strategic terms. On 9 February 2026, Washington and Dhaka signed an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. The United States maintained a 19 percent reciprocal tariff rate on most Bangladeshi goods while offering zero treatment for identified products, and Bangladesh committed to significant market-access and regulatory measures for American goods and services.
The agreement shows why foreign policy can no longer be separated from domestic economic reform. Trade negotiations now reach into standards, state-owned enterprises, subsidies, customs procedures, anti-corruption rules and digital commerce. Dhaka should therefore treat the United States not only as a security or democracy interlocutor, but as a market, technology partner, source of investment, centre of higher education and home to a large Bangladeshi diaspora. At the same time, economic agreements should be evaluated transparently for their distributional effects at home.
China, the Gulf and ASEAN: Diversify the Economic Base
China will remain essential to Bangladesh as a supplier of machinery, industrial inputs, infrastructure and investment. The task is to make the relationship more balanced by increasing Bangladeshi exports, attracting export-oriented manufacturing, obtaining technology, and scrutinising debt and procurement terms. Cooperation should be project-specific and transparent enough that engagement with Beijing is not automatically interpreted as strategic alignment against another country.
The Gulf states should also be viewed as more than labour destinations and energy suppliers. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait are investing heavily in logistics, food security, tourism, health, artificial intelligence and financial services. Bangladesh can connect those investment priorities to its own needs in ports, food processing, renewable energy, healthcare and skills development. Labour diplomacy should focus on wages, recruitment costs, certification, worker protection and upward mobility, not simply on sending larger numbers of workers abroad.
Southeast Asia deserves a larger place in Bangladesh’s external strategy as well. Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam offer opportunities in finance, ports, electronics, halal industries, higher education, healthcare, food processing and supply-chain management. Bangladesh’s economic future should not be confined to South Asia when its geography also opens toward the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia.
Strategic Autonomy Requires Rules at Home
A diversified foreign policy will fail if it is only a slogan. Strategic autonomy depends on domestic institutions that can compare offers, publish terms and resist politically convenient but economically weak deals. Major projects in ports, energy, defence and infrastructure should be subject to debt-risk analysis, competitive procurement and clear public-interest tests. Otherwise, diversification can simply produce multiple forms of dependence instead of genuine autonomy.
Bangladesh should also avoid using one country as the gateway to another. It needs multiple options in energy, defence procurement, development finance, export markets, imports and labour mobility. That reduces vulnerability when a partner changes policy, imposes conditions or faces its own political crisis.
The final principle is simple: relationships should be judged by outcomes. Diplomatic success is not the number of summit photographs or declarations of friendship. It is whether partnerships open markets, improve skills, create decent jobs, expand research, bring technology, strengthen bargaining power and give Bangladesh more choices. A country with more credible options is harder to pressure and better able to protect its national interest.
Bangladesh does not need to choose a permanent camp. It needs a disciplined portfolio of partnerships: close to neighbours because of geography, diversified in trade and finance, ambitious in technology, transparent in strategic projects and careful about dependence. In a more competitive international system, that is not indecision. It is statecraft.
Kawsar Mia is a Lecturer in Civics and Good Governance at Cosmopolitan College, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Dr. Abdul Momen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Islamic History and Culture at Jagannath University, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.
