By Roshelle Fernando
Maritime Domain Awareness emerges as a vital enabler for maritime security. Both littoral and non-littoral states have become increasingly interested and taken strategic steps to promote the monitoring, regulation, and defence of the maritime interests.
For Sri Lanka maritime domain awareness is utmost importance, especially since its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is practically eight times as large as its landmass. Outside the EEZ, Sri Lanka also has jurisdiction over vast search and rescue areas and an extent of the extended continental shelf. All these maritime domains, like territorial waters, the EEZ, and areas beyond require governance and protection. As a littoral country, Sri Lanka must guard its economic interests in such regions. This is not merely observation, but surveillance, data fusion, intelligence gathering, and inter-agency coordination guarantee a real-time understanding of events developing in maritime regions.
As the information backbone of maritime security, maritime domain awareness provides early warning of threats, informs decision-making, and enables timely and coordinated responses to developing threats at sea. The development of maritime domain awareness has been shaped by a series of defining events, including the expansion of state duties under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), growing recognition of transnational maritime threats, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) exacerbated maritime terrorism fears, rapid technological change, embracing intelligence-led policing and enhanced global capacity-building initiatives.
Sri Lanka’s Maritime Domain Awareness: Institutional Gaps and Emerging Capabilities
Despite the recognition of maritime security as an important aspect, Sri Lanka has no legally enforceable, systematically integrated maritime domain awareness mechanism in place. The functions are shared across several institutions like the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN), Sri Lanka Coast Guard (SLCG), Ministry of Fisheries, Marine Environmental Protection Authority (MEPA), and National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency (NARA) among others. However, Sri Lanka lacks a specific national legal system or centralized enforcement mechanism to control, implement and coordinate maritime domain awareness effectively.
As a nation that depends largely on its maritime space for economy, security and trade, Sri Lanka has the responsibility of monitoring a huge and complex ocean space. Accordingly, maritime domain awareness must be enhanced for Sri Lanka to handle threats and leverage opportunities in the seas. The country’s past, especially the 30-year internal conflict, was a turning point in realizing the importance of maritime surveillance. The evolution of maritime threats during the period of the war, such as arms smuggling and marine terrorism prompted the evolution of maritime domain awareness in Sri Lanka. Maritime surveillance is complex by virtue of the expansiveness of the maritime environment and the lack of definable land-to-land borders. This fragmentation emphasizes the need for Sri Lanka to implement integrated maritime domain awareness frameworks that not only conduct local observation but regional data sharing as well. Therefore, technological advancements and institutional merging are vital in enhancing threat detection.
SLN and the Information Fusion Center (IFC) are hubs of Sri Lanka’s maritime domain awareness structure, which has long led maritime surveillance, intelligence gathering, and operational coordination. The SLN established the IFC in 2022 in Colombo, which is a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) funded unit now operated by 6 – 8 operators and an officer-in-charge. While the IFC is meant to be a national center for maritime domain awareness, it is currently a Navy initiative with no set of process or legal provision to connect data from other national agencies. Additionally, Cabinet Memorandum has been forwarded to expand the IFC’s mandate and structure into a multi-agency national center, but institutional and legal loopholes persist unresolved.
The IFC at Colombo is also connected to regional and global fusion center networks, following India, Madagascar, and Singapore. The centers exchange real-time data on maritime threats, including dark and white shipping, and facilitate joint response to piracy, smuggling, and other border crimes. The Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC), which operates and is directed by the SLN, plays a vital role in search and rescue (SAR) efforts. 24/7 operational and supported by seven signal stations, the MRCC utilizes web-based maritime domain awareness tools in tracking distress signals and maritime alerts. Also, the SLCG supports naval action by being present in all 26 fishery harbors and four regional headquarters at Kankesanthurai, Trincomalee, Mirissa, and Wellawatta. Despite such physical presence, the Coast Guard has no formal operations branch for maritime domain awareness, with only two officers performing maritime domain awareness work. The organization is challenged with its limited resources and inadequate staff, and although some radar and Automatic Identification System (AIS) tools are operational, the SLCG’s maritime domain awareness capabilities are still in initial development phases, having started in the previous 4–5 years.
In improving its maritime domain awareness for coordination, Sri Lanka has been involved in a succession of regional and global initiatives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs organizing the Sri Lanka – Australia Strategic Maritime Dialogue with the Australian High Commission, DGMSS, MEPA, NARA, and Sri Lanka Customs. In addition, the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have collaborated trilaterally to conduct a series of workshops with a maritime domain awareness theme. The most recent workshop was hosted by the Embassy of Japan on developing the capability for maritime domain awareness on March 2025, in collaboration with The Geopolitical Cartographer, the IORAG, and the UNODC.
Technological Advances and Operational Challenges
There has been notable improvement by Sri Lanka in its capacity to improve its maritime domain awareness capabilities, which include installation of coastal radar systems, AIS transponders, satellite surveillance systems, and the formation of IFC and MRCC by the SLN. Sri Lanka uses other digital tools like SeaVision, Skylight, Marine Traffic, Windy, IORIS, VMS and ReCAAP for surveillance and detection of IUU activities. However, despite technological advancement, there are still difficulties with operations. Although AIS helps to track the compliant vessels, it is very difficult to detect the so-called “dark vessels,” especially since Sri Lanka lacks a sovereign satellite and airborne surveillance capabilities. Other barriers to effective use of existing maritime domain awareness infrastructure are connectivity problems that include poor satellite communications, incomplete coverage of networks, cybersecurity, and lack of energy.
A recent case involving US-sanctioned Iranian “dark fleet” tankers off the Sri Lankan coast further demonstrates the importance of Maritime Domain Awareness. In August 2026, 16 Iranian-flagged VLCCs were monitored just outside Sri Lanka’s territorial waters near Galle, with several subsequently dispersing from the area. Although no illegal activity was detected within Sri Lankan waters, the case highlights the need to integrate multiple surveillance and intelligence sources, strengthen information sharing, and enhance coordination among national and international maritime-security stakeholders.
Despite the advances in Sri Lanka’s operational maritime domain awareness, there remain major policy and legal inadequacies that limit effective implementation. There is no comprehensive maritime law of enforcement, Civil Maritime Security Strategy, or any legal framework for maritime domain awareness in the country, thus leading to fragmented accountability, poor coordination among government agencies, and overlapping mandates. While the IFC and MRCC of the Sri Lanka Navy have improved operational effectiveness, they remain isolated from other government departments like Coast Guard, Customs, and Department of Fisheries regarding maritime intelligence. Fragmented governance not only affects the country’s maritime security but also other national objectives such as environmental protection, blue economy, and investment. Lack of resources within critical maritime organizations also restricts surveillance and enforcement capacity, and absence of formal means of information exchange and decision-making reduces national preparedness.
Recommendations for Policy and Practice
- Establish a single national maritime domain awareness authority that brings together military and civilian agencies under a shared common command and coordination structure.
- Conceptualize and develop a maritime security policy and legal framework to establish roles and facilitate joint enforcement.
- Adopt formal inter-agency data sharing protocols and formal Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) between central institutions.
- Allocate direct fiscal resources for maritime domain awareness of establishment, technology upgradation, infrastructure, and recruitment of qualified personnel.
- Increase human resource capability at IFC and MRCC through recruiting and training specialists from civilian partners like MEPA, NARA, and Fisheries.
- Increase technology systems for real-time threat identification and data processing, including secure satellite, AI-based software, and classified data processing systems.
- Implement data classification procedures to protect sensitive maritime intelligence and limit unauthorized access.
- Uplift regional and international collaboration through mutual joint patrols, mutual training exercises, and participation in regional conferences.
In conclusion, the maritime domain awareness of Sri Lanka is crucial in ensuring the safety of the enormous maritime interests of the country along with economic and environmental security.
Roshelle Fernando is a Social Media Analyst at Factum, working across social media monitoring, digital research and current global affairs analysis. She holds a bachelor’s degree with honours in International Relations from the University of Colombo. Her interests include international relations, ocean governance, global affairs, and evolving geopolitical dynamics.
Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank/consultancy on Diplomacy, Tech-Plomacy, Digital and Energy Futures accessible via www.factum.lk.
The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.
