Vinod Moonesinghe
At the beginning of 2003, the United States seemed on top of the world. The sole superpower, its ideologues spoke openly of America as the “global policeman”, fighting multiple major wars enforcing a “Pax Americana.” That March, the US invaded Iraq, setting in motion a sequence of events which resulted in today’s increasingly multi-polar world.
US President George W Bush launched the invasion, under pressure from his conservative corporate and political allies. Iraq not only contained oil riches, but its strategic position also looked tempting to a power intent on expansion in the region.
Bush’s predecessor, Bill Clinton had laid the foundation for the invasion by signing his assent to the Iraq Liberation Bill in 1998. The US had accused Iraq falsely of making “weapons of mass destruction” and prefaced its invasion with a media blitz which created in the American mind a false equivalence between Iraq and the terror group Al Qaeda.
Under sanctions since the Gulf War of 1991, the US and UK had bombed Iraq continuously for almost two years. Also starting in 2001, the US prepared the logistic framework for the invasion, with systems such as storage for over 30 million litres of fuel, with a special pipeline up to the Kuwait/Iraq border, to provide the 9 million litres of fuel the US forces needed daily.
Shock and Awe
The USA launched its attack on Iraq, just as it had done during the Gulf War in 1991 – with an air assault reminiscent of a video game. This time they based their plan on a new “effects-based” approach, with which the Pentagon had replaced its “AirLand Battle” doctrine.
Developed after a long gestation period following its 1983 Granada debacle, the new doctrine, better known as “Shock and Awe” or “Rapid Dominance”, intended to operate much as the Nazi “Blitzkrieg”, aiming to terrorise the enemy leadership, causing it to freeze. George W Bush’s Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld termed it “Transformation” and applied it to Iraq. In a Pentagon presentation, one officer involved in the concept said that
“… the effects that we are trying to create are to make it so apparent and so overwhelming at the very outset of potential military operations that the adversary quickly realises that there is no real alternative here other than to fight and die or to give up.”
The strategy for the operation, codenamed “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, involved launching a blitz using 1,800 American, Australian, British and Canadian aircraft. On the first two days, an unprecedented avalanche of over 800 missiles and over 2,500 bombs targeted troops and power and water supplies, intending to “shatter Iraq physically, emotionally and psychologically.” In contrast to “Operation Desert Storm”, which only had 10% of aerial weapons being precision-guided, this new operation aimed to have 80% precision-guided weapons.
The assault on Iraq began on the night of 19-20 March 2003 with a “decapitation strike” against the Iraqi leadership, meant to bring the war to a swift conclusion. However, it failed. The next few nights witnessed the heaviest bombing that Baghdad had seen in 20 years of war, incurring corresponding civilian casualties – despite claims of “immaculate war”, in which high-precision strikes “surgically” destroyed purely military targets, with little “collateral damage”.
Overwhelming advantage
Although this onslaught flattened Iraqi command posts and bunkers, it only reduced marginally the operational effectiveness of Iraqi formations. No large-scale collapse occurred. Saddam Hussein remained in control of his forces, which continued to mount organised resistance to the invasion. The invasion, intended merely as an occupation of an already-surrendered country, reverted to AirLand.
The US and its Australian, British, South Korean, Polish, and Canadian allies (the last-named only in non-lethal support) deployed nearly 470,000 air force, military, and naval personnel for the operation. For the ground invasion of Iraq, the US military had deployed five of its 10 active Army divisions and one of three Marine divisions to the Gulf, backed by a British armoured Division and air assault and commando units and by Australian and Polish Special Forces.
The force totalled some 200,000 soldiers and marines, equipped with about 500 M-1 Abrams and Challenger II tanks, over 400 other armoured vehicles, 150 guns and 18 multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRL), and 350 helicopters. More troops with tanks and guns were deployed with the Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq.
With logistics capabilities far-reduced, Iraq could no longer move troops quickly around the country (especially given US air attack capabilities), so those divisions not in the path of the invading forces were effectively out of the picture. Only 70,000 men and about 700 tanks old tanks faced the invaders, of the total Iraqi ground forces available estimated at between 350,000 and 425,000.
They lacked modern defensive weaponry, such as anti-tank guided missiles (ATGW) and even anti-tank mines, due to sanctions then in force. Even more importantly, the sanctions had caused severe weaknesses in Iraqi military training. Most Iraqi troops had fired no live ammunition in the previous year. This proved disastrous, as in the subsequent battles tanks missed their targets and even rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) aimed wrongly or fired too soon to be effective.
Logistics
In comparison, the US war machine required 9 million litres of fuel per day to keep running. Since early 2001, a system capable of storing over 30 million litres of fuel, with a special pipeline up to the Kuwait/Iraq border had been constructed with the invasion of Iraq in mind. This and similar systems in place for other supplies, would enable the US and its allies to advance swiftly up both banks of the Euphrates to Baghdad, moving at the highest possible speed, bypassing resistance, and fighting only when absolutely necessary.
The supply of fuel, ammunition, and other necessary provisions to advancing troops, to be replenished at one or two-day intervals, necessitated the smooth functioning of logistics, only possible if the Iraqis did not interfere. However, the overwhelming advantage of the Americans and their allies made it highly likely that they would defeat the opposition with ease. True to expectations, they managed to reach Baghdad within a matter of weeks.
However, the Iraqi forces, sometimes surrounded, did not collapse, continuing to fight at strategic towns long after being bypassed. On several occasions, Iraqi troops retreated and then counter-attacked, rather than “fleeing” as reported by the “embedded” media.
A post-operation assessment of noted that every part of each US division engaged in combat operations – even “tail” units becoming “front line.” Iraqi irregular troops lay low and attacked soft targets behind US lines once the main forces had advanced past them, with assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.
This disrupted communications, preventing vital supplies, especially fuel and ammunition, from getting through. The almost continuous expenditure of ammunition by lead units engaging the Iraqis on a scale not planned, taxed the available logistical back-up beyond its capabilities.
At one point, US and allied frontline troops were short of basics such as food (and even toilet paper). Hence, the Americans had to halt and clear up their threatened lines of communications, to which they had to commit two US Airborne Divisions, originally intended to besiege Baghdad.
Cost
Ultimately, Iraqi resistance did collapse. Russia’s Ambassador to Iraq Vladimir Titorenko said that Iraqi generals entered into secret deal with the Americans to refrain from resistance and virtually surrendered heavily-fortified Baghdad without a fight. So, the USA conquered Iraq successfully through “Shock and Awe”, based on the effects of “smart bribes”, rather than “smart bombs”. On 1 May 2003 George W Bush went on board a US aircraft carrier off the coast of California and announced the end of the war.
However, isolated troops continued to fight the Americans and resistance grew. By the time the US withdrew officially from Iraq nine years later, more than 4,800 American and allied troops and between 100,000 and 1,000,000 Iraqis would be dead. The Bush administration estimated the war’s cost would be $50 billion to $60 billion, but it ended up costing about US$ 1 trillion. Far more seriously, it depleted US military hardware stocks, leaving few resources available for other uses. The war cost the USA its “sole superpower” status.
A historical study of the Iraq war’s lessons, commissioned in 2013 by top Army commander General Ray Odierno, and conducted by several field grade officers at the US Army War College, concluded in 2018 that the war weakened Iraq, traditionally a regional counterbalance to Iran, and had key segments of its government acting in the Iranian interest. Consequently, Iran’s. Only Iran, its influence extending rapidly to Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, and with increased confidence, emerged as the only victor.
Vinod Moonesinghe read mechanical engineering at the University of Westminster, and worked in Sri Lanka in the tea machinery and motor spares industries, as well as the railways. He later turned to journalism and writing history. He served as chair of the Board of Governors of the Ceylon German Technical Training Institute.
Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.
The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.
