AN ANALYTICAL DISCLOSER OF STATUS AFTER THE ACTION AT SEA
By Rear Admiral YN Jayarathna (Retd)
This is an After-Action Analysis1 of the sinking of IRIS (Islamic Republic of Iran Ship) Dena F75, a Frigate Class warship that was torpedoed on 4th March 2026 in Sri Lanka’s maritime jurisdiction. The incident happened outside the territorial waters, yet within the Contiguous Zone, EEZ and in the Sri Lanka’s Search & Rescue Region (SRR). Each of these components of maritime jurisdiction; namely territorial waters, contiguous zone and the Exclusive Economic Zone have distinctive legal regimes and have globally accepted definitions, whereas the Search & Rescue Region (SRR) is State’s obligation under the SOLAS Convention. These components of the maritime jurisdiction are covered in the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Sri Lanka is among one of the pioneering States to sign the Convention on 10th Dec 1982 and ratifying on 19th July 1994. Similarly, India signed on 10th Dec 1982 and ratified on 29th June 1995. Although Iran signed on10th Dec 1982 they still are to ratify UNCLOS! USA is not a signatory to the UNCLOS.
The heading of this article is ‘Partner to all is Partner to none’ and was extracted from a media report on India’s role analysed under the circumstances of post-torpedo incident. What it means regarding India is that India seeks partnership with all but not a partner to any when needed! Further analysis points out that there is no commitment from India to her partners like Iran, whilst India expects commitments from her partners! Having come under USA-Israel attack in what is coined as ’12-Day war’ in 2025, Iran came under yet another similar attack in March 2026. Compared to the last, Iran appears to face the assault almost single-handedly without Houthis, Hezbollah and other notable global players like Russia and China. The media reports originating from India suggest that India could have supported Iran much better in the latest conflict. This makes India’s stake at risk and is explained in deep in subsequent paragraphs.
The purpose of using this heading in this analytical article is to stimulate global thoughts of numerous alliances of the global players, who leads to meet their strategic interests and how far such benefit in pursuing national interests of the lesser players!
The Narrative:
On the invitation of India, the Islamic Republic of Iran despatched three-ship flotilla to the Indian Ocean where IRIS Dena is to participate for the India’s International Fleet Review at Visakhapatnam (Vizag) in Bay of Bengal (BoB) on 18th Feb 2026. Thereafter the ship engaged in the 13th edition of the annual naval exercise of the Indian Navy called MILAN 2026 from 18th-25th Feb 2026. As per the event web page, 74 countries participated with naval vessels2. Sri Lanka was represented by SLNS Sagara (an OPV Class vessel donated by India in 2015) and SLNS Nandimithra (Fast Missile Vessel made in Israel and taken over by Sri Lanka in 2000). The exercise ended on 25th Feb 2026, and the naval vessels left Vizag at different time intervals and two Sri Lankan Naval Vessels returned to their home-ports on 27th Feb 2026. On 28th Feb 2026, USA-Israel alliance started attacking Iran. It is noteworthy that the Indian Prime Minister returned to New Delhi on 26th Feb 2026 after a two-day State visit to Israel where he even addressed the Israel Parliament called Knesset.
As the conflict broke out in the Persian Gulf, the region more specifically the northern part of the Arabian Sea became a sea area where warring parties might get involved in sea battles. It appears that when the conflict started on 28th Feb, the Iranian Navy was clustered around Bandar Abbas at Strait of Hormuz and the three-ship flotilla (IRIS Dena; Frigate, IRIS Busher; Supply Ship & IRIS Lavan; Supply Ship) having left Iran for IRIS Dena to reach Vizag on 17th Feb 2026 were the only naval vessels in the Indian Ocean away from the Arabian Sea.
The incident marks the first sinking of an enemy ship by a torpedo by the Americans since the end of world War II. And in contemporary history, there have been three such incidents; the sinking of Indian Naval Vessel Khukri by a Pakistan torpedo in 1971, sinking of Argentinian Naval vessel General Belgrano by Royal Navy of Great Britain in 1982 and the sinking of South Korean Naval ship Cheonan by North Korean Midget-Submarine in 2010.
The incident:
Having left Vizag on 26th Feb 2026 the IRIS Dena was in her passage for her home port and the supply ship was in company. They must have been instructed by Teheran by this time to not to enter the Arabian sea as on 28th Feb the US-Israel coalition started to attack Iran. Thus, sometime around 1st March, (possibly, as no official confirmation of this affair is made public yet) Colombo based Iranian Embassy forwarded a diplomatic note requesting for a port call for two vessels namely for IRIS Dena and IRIS Busher. Whilst waiting for these diplomatic clearances IRIS Dena was torpedoed in Sri Lanka’s contiguous Zone around 0500 hours by an American submarine that must have been tracking the target for some hours. The passage of IRIS Dena around Sri Lanka’s south-eastern corner is normal route that any warship likely to use, avoiding the territorial seas and the location of the torpedo attack as officially made known as is 21 Nautical Miles from Galle at bearing 266 degrees. That is the standard position indicating system in naval system where always a prominent land point is used to indicate the range (distance) and the bearing. When plotted on a nautical chart the location’s nearest landfall (the closest land: the closest land may not be the land-point used for the position indication!) is at Hikkaduwa at a distance of 15 nautical miles. The depth of water at the location is within the 1000m depth contour (called isobath in naval terminology, to distinctively separate from the hight contours used on land) at around 760m of water depth.
What is at Stake: Sri Lanka
The incident exposed Sri Lanka’s lack of decision-making capacity on maritime matters, and when the authorities on receipt the Diplomatic Note for the port calls, they seem to have dragged their feet, probably assuming that the Iranian will opt for an alternative solution to seek a port call elsewhere. The idea of Naval Vessel vulnerability was never taken into consideration with only the political repercussion of allowing Iranian vessels to make a port call when USA is engaged in attacking Iran, being the topmost concern! It has learnt that the port call request has been discussed at the Security Council meeting held on 28th Feb (Saturday) without making a decision, where the Navy Commander, being the top-most advisor to the Government may not have either briefed the Security Council of alternative options available, and likely scenarios or his opinion was not sought at all!
Sri Lanka Navy, having robust Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) tools to track the surface ships, knew about the three Iranian ship presence in the Indian ocean region, with two ships very close to Sri Lanka’s south-eastern coastline. And when Iran was attacked on 28th Feb, it appears that the Navy’s operational command failed to see the possibility of these Iranian Naval vessels becoming a target! Thus, it appears the days just spent on routine system monitoring without anyone analysing the passage of Iranian ships, especially the Frigate, one of the Iranian Navy’s ‘show-piece’ warships, would be highly vulnerable to a strike. The Americans had made it clear by this time that they would render Iran’s force projection and operational capacities to nought. It seems that the SLN and the State had failed to link Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT); US press statements stated operational goals, with the targeting opportunity which was unfolding in the seas off Sri Lanka’s south, which they would have observed using our MDA tools.
The Sri Lanka Navy does not have underwater detection or sub-surface surveillance system in the southern part of the island (which is called Laccadive Seas in the nautical charts and identified by the International Hydrographic Organization’s publications) as the consecutive Government’s (and the incumbent) never have thought of investing for such, or to develop a seabed sensor network due to the fact that the seas are deeper in that region. However, even with such a system in place, the nature of the oceanographic parameters in the area makes it difficult to detect underwater movement of submarines due to the mixing of low-salinity waters of the Bay of Bengal and the high salinity waters of the Arabian Sea.
Sri Lanka’s MDA capacity was advanced and a first of its kind in the South Asian region, as a result of countermeasures against the separatist terrorist’s activities at sea. The Navy invested heavily on network-centric coastal radar systems that gave a comprehensive coverage up to 40/50 nautical miles around the island where all ships and fishing vessels were tracked and identified. The High-Frequency Surface Wave Radar (HFSWR) at Nilaweli gave coverage up to 200 nautical miles in the north-eastern seaboard effectively making the LTTE’s gun-running ships visible from ashore in this sector. This facility is the only such terrestrial based sensor system in the South Asia. The gaps of coverage of coastal radar system were quickly covered after the LTTE’s daring suicide attack at Galle Naval Base on 18th Oct 2006, making the island-wide coastal integrated radar system virtually allowing complete real-time picture of the whole island. Having initiated the ‘white-shipping system in late 2000’s by the Indian Navy, India wanted to link with the already running Sri Lanka’s system to expand their MDA capacities, thus four stations; Beruwala (Barbarian Light house), Galle, Dondra Point and the Little Basses were linked to the Indian system under an arrangement.
This led to 2011 tri-party maritime security agreement with India-Maldives-Sri Lanka, which when resurrected in 2020 and reborn as the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC). Sri Lanka’s MDA investment is at risk of decay and collapse, with State not investing on modernizing the existing HFSWR installation and not investing on planned additional new HFSWR station in Panama (to cover the South-Eastern seaboard) which would have given a total coverage of the island’s EEZ. To make it clear; the SLN had made the plans and projected them to the State, but the State failed to prioritise providing funding for such critical maritime surveillance systems over the years.
Thus, what is at stake is the Island’s reputation of MDA system to analyse the probable and possible actions at sea. Having data alone is not enough in today’s context and today’s demand is for the analysis; making sense of the data collected through the MDA tools whether government or commercial, that helps to see surface ships albeit submarines!
Clearly, the Navy’s operational command had ignored to analyse the return passage of Iranian vessel (as it is a Vessel of Interest: VoI, under the circumstances) for a potential skirmish at sea. The Laccadive Seas are frequented by submarines operated by all global players; USA, France, India, China, Pakistan and UK etc) as such is a good training grounds with tropical waters (which test underwater sensors to its extremes due to variations of salinity and temperature difference underwater), main sea lane of shipping (where all ships indicate their own noise signature for SONAR operators to identify, archive data for vessel identification), and most importantly to test each other out by trying to identify other submarines underwater!
As all submarines known to be operating within some 500-750 m water depth area as available sources points out, to detect a submarine one need another submarine. The maritime surveillance aircraft what Sri Lanka got from the USA or from Australia are capable only of detection at surface and none of these aircrafts are fitted with submarine detection instruments. To detect a submarine operating at depth is visible from above on extreme rare case of clear visibility where it most certainly will be a coincident by luck than by choice! Thus, what is at stake is not investing on diversified systems to meet the three spectrums of the oceans; air, surface and underwater!
Does Sri Lanka’s institutional establishments such as the Colombo Information Fusion Centre (IFC Colombo) served the purpose of very establishment? Hardly so, as all updates and comments become restrained probably because of the political reason, when the Fusion Centre supposed to connect information for good of the island’s credibility. Even there was some unknown political pressure, it is the Navy that need to stand on its purpose, thereby crediting the Government at the end. The Colombo IFC webpage was not updated for 48 hours, despite repeated reminders by the writer as it was established in 2019 as a result of operational necessity to play island’s due part in the maritime domain in the Indian ocean. By not updating this information, what was made at stake was the very credibility these IFC supposed to be having! As a regional maritime player, Sri Lanka’s reputation is being assessed through these establishments and when they do not perform the classic role it supposed to do, the credibility is doubted!
The next step for Sri Lanka is to undertake a comprehensive investigation into the incident based on survivor’s accounts, technical surveys; which include investigating the wreck at seabed with remote vehicles and analysing the chronological order of associated events. What is expected from this investigation is to enhance Sri Lanka’s credibility as a coastal State and for obvious reasons the report has to happen in collaboration with the Iranian authorities. The writer foresees the need for two reports; the main report of confidential nature which will have to be shared between the two-navies, whilst the summarized report for public consumption. The unique nature of the torpedo attack, makes the incident be recorded for ‘case-studies’, thereby eliminating possible ‘conspiracy theories’ creeping in to the thought processes in following years.
A good example is how the South Korean Government eventually salvaged the torpedoed vessel in 2010, proving the destruction was deliberate and by North Korean sources. The depth in this incident is too deep for a recovery thus underwater recording and a scan by a remotely operated underwater vessel, is the best viable option the Government should do in fulfilling coastal State responsibilities. This investigation is part of the Coastal State responsibilities under the IMO (International Maritime Organization) Resolution No: MSC.255 (84) and comes under the Casualty Investigation Code. Sri Lanka is a signatory to IMO cand governed by IMO Circulars and Resolutions. The Code although primarily designed for the merchant vessels remains the basis for investigations of all kind of vessels including naval vessels.
What is at Stake: India
The torpedoing incident is a ‘slap on the face’ of India! The Indians having switched from politically pro-Russians stance in 80’s to Pro-Americans by 90’s were boasting of their American alliances and this incident had embarrassed Indians. Thus, more than Sri Lanka, it is India who is at stake through this torpedo attack as they claim as the ‘net-security provider’ to the Indian ocean region.
No country is going to disclose their military intentions to another country and when Indian Prime Minister Modi visited Israel, they may have not indicated any intentions. Similarly USA may have not disclosed their submarine operations to India, nor the intention to attack, leaving India also ‘at-sea’ on the incident. Having invited Iranian Navy to attend their International Fleet Review and the MILAN naval exercise, Indian naval authorities could have made a more thorough threat assessment and done something about the Iranian vessel that is bound to make a return passage as belligerent party; when the ship comes to Vizag it was not a belligerent party but when returning it is a belligerent party!
India had trumpeted that they have established themselves to provide the net-security to the Indian ocean region and having taken by surprise of this American attack, may have to rethink on their stand. Already, as per several Indian-based media reports, the Indian submarines are having repeated technical issues, and apparently, they are not out at sea as they should, giving rise to the question of Indian naval prowess in balancing naval competition in the Indian ocean.
The absence of official statement from the Indian authorities on the sinking of the Iranian frigate and the media coverage of the deliberations of the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi (from 5th-7th March 2026) demonstrate clear absence of ‘bold and precise talks’ as used to be in the Indian forums earlier. The torpedo, it appears, have sank not only an Iranian ship but also the majority viewpoint of Indian on Americans! And it appears that Russia has gained grounds as a trusted partner compared to the Americans in the Indian mind-set. In anyway, India has continued to maintain their military relations with Russia despite the political orientation more towards the west.
In fact, the inability of Indian surveillance and intelligence systems to ‘sense’ something is about to happen is not a surprise as the lack of Indian surveillance coverage was first demonstrated when Malaysian Flight MH-370 went missing on 8th March 2014. The investigators request to seek surveillance evidence of so-called Indian air surveillance systems in the Malacca Strait was denied when it was later revealed that there was no such surveillance on that part of the Indian Ocean by the Indian! Similarly, this incident demonstrates that there is a lack of surveillance by Indian submarines in the vast Indian ocean where the Indian media always talk about Chinese submarines! Apparently underwater domain awareness is not covering all of the Indian ocean. However, it is quite well understood that it is impossible to have such coverage but not even covering the crucial areas of interest. This is a total system failure to analyse the ‘possible picture’ due to lack of data or intelligence foresight, and India, being the major Naval Force in the region bare the much of embarrassment by not knowing what is happening in Indian Ocean!
The incident apparently has stirred social media campaign against American attitude towards India and against the BJP led Government. It is a delicate balance, as India wishes to consolidate on her global role with the help of America’s global status where India think USA need India as a partner on equal terms. This is another aspect in today’s political environment where internal political stability could be affected through an incident in maritime incidents.
What is at Stake: Iran
Iranian Naval Vessel was evidently not at ‘combat station’; meaning not ready for battle at sea. The combat efficiency of the Iranian Navy is obviously not at the level the world expected, and this is visible in the ongoing conflict. Today, Iranian Navy has become an easy target for American and Israel Air forces. It’s very hard to fathom out why the Iranians just left their naval vessels to be ‘sitting ducks’ without air superiority or air cover.
IRIS Dena, when analysed thru the American submarine periscope-recording, stood no chance and was a sitting duck for a Submarine’s Commanding Officer who would don a feather in his command! The explosion surely will not give time for below deck personnel to seek escape, and the interviewing of the survived personnel would indicate the ‘ship-culture’ onboard. The vessel sinks within minutes and no matter how well the naval personnel were trained, their readiness more especially in combat survival at sea is yet to be uncovered. The timing of the torpedo attack demonstrate that the attacker has conducted himself with in the legal parameters, and the stake is high on Iranian Naval authorities to prove that their naval vessel was in combat stations at all times!
The survivors would reveal the true status of the affairs onboard, from their training to the moment of torpedo attack. The Iranian media report of ‘American Forces’ warning the Frigate to abandon ship need deep investigation as such coincides with analysis from the American Video release of the torpedo attack. In the video, it is visible that number of crew already mustered on heli-deck at after, and several groups moving at the bows and front weather decks suggesting that there has been a commotion onboard just before the torpedo attack. What is at stake is the operational combat efficiency of the Iranian Navy; now of course reduced to mere two-ship Navy as all their key naval vessels were destroyed to USA-Israel attacks. Having no air-superiority, these Iranian Naval assets were just ‘easy targets’ for the combined air assaults.
What is at Stake: China
China’s defence technology is at stake, and the euphoria they enjoyed from Indo-Pak conflict in 2025, of the so-called technology superiority appears to have been vanished with Iranian conflict. For example, JY-27A anti-stealth radar system failed in Venezuela, and this became a crucial factor in the Iranian conflict where American and Israel Air Force dominated the air space and maintain the air-superiority. Despite Iranians domination of use of drones, ballistic missiles and UAVs, the Iranian Airforce failed to protect the air space, and it is the Iranian Naval prowess that vanished with it. Having plethora of small surface vessels for unconventional naval warfare does not stands to achieve the results if air dominance is lost. And the Chinese radars systems and jamming system it appears have made ineffective against the technology driven combat action of the USA.
What is at Stake: Indian Ocean
The Indian Ocean is at stake, with lapses in the overall regional security architecture being exposed through the torpedo attack. The regional security architecture of Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) is the collective body that the region established to protect regional interest and this community is now entrusted with taking tangible action for the benefit of the regional stakeholders. This is a strategic alliance that should not be looked down and in need of structural leadership who understand the oceanic space and the geopolitical picture. There cannot be extra regional security architecture to oversee the Indian Ocean security as such is invariably to look after the extra-regional interest; not the regions!
The smaller islands are at stake; more especially the island s closer to the Diago Gracia, just as Sri Lanka’s closeness to Main Sea Lane of Communication. Monitoring Underwater Domain is a challenge for these stakeholders but collectively or at least they should start investing on same. The Information Fusion Centres hardly share analysis albeit it’s not done in the region! The incident demonstrated the lack of political will of taking decisions on matters maritime which eventually leads bigger crisis.
Conclusion:
The Indian Ocean needs to be safeguarded for its own identity, and such need broader statecraft and swift decision making in today’s fast paced geo-political landscape. The social media platforms, spread of news and information compel Governments to respond fast, establish credibility and stands as a trusted and reliable maritime partner.
The report originating from Tel Aviv also points out the trace of uncertainty of the end-states to be achieved from the military campaign, as the campaign is more or less controlled by USA where Israel remains a mere responder to demands. At the same time the Indian media points out the view of the attributes to the incident, whereas per one Indian veteran submariner point out warships are warships, whether in peace time or conflicts, as warships follows always follow protocols that ensure battle preparedness of the naval vessels. These combat ready, battle readiness cannot be developed overnight as such need horning of skills varying from situational awareness to technical know-how. It is worthy of noting that in 2010, when Somalian piracy was expanding in the region the Kenyan Navy discovered how ill-prepared their naval personnel were due to years of neglection by the Government.
The saved Iranian Naval Personnel is a key to the whole middle-eastern region for Sri Lanka, when these personnel return to their home country will be talking about their experience in Sri Lanka. Similar to Japan gratitude to the Late President JR Jayewardene due to his remarks at the San Francisco summit, these naval personnel will be taking a much-publicised picture of Sri Lanka to the region. This, Sri Lanka should exploit to the hilt and the stand taken to be exploited to highlight the island’s role in Indian Ocean affairs.
Sri Lanka should be pushing her national interest at this moment, to enhance island’s credibility and stand. Surely with Iranian cooperation and inhouse expertise, Sri Lanka can do much or otherwise at stake is our credibility as a regional maritime player, which directly link to the Statecraft of the island nation!
Rear Admiral YN Jayarathna (Retd) was the Director General Naval Operations of the Sri Lanka Navy in 2019-2021 during which MT New Diamond Fire, resurrection of Colombo Security Conclave and several other maritime incidents were managed and supervised under MRCC. These crisis management has made Sri Lanka’s reputation as a regional player very conspicuous and by expanding the Navy’s operational role into Arabian Sea, the Sri Lankan Navy was widely credited with the regional role it plays resulting openings at the Bahrain based Combined Maritime Force. He, with his battle decorated illustrious career of nearly 36 years remains one of the most sought-after experts on maritime intelligence, maritime operations and the undersea cables. With his hydrographic expertise he is better aware of underwater domain and their applicability in today’s naval warfare. He has been a regular lecturer at foreign naval staff colleges, national defence colleges and in universities owing to his wide understanding of marine science, national security and the geo-political matters.
Factum is an Asia-Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.
The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.
