By Jayson Cainglet
When U.S. President Donald Trump returned to the world stage at the 47th ASEAN Summit in October, his message was loud and clear: America is open for business—but only on his terms.
While headlines focused on the spectacle of Trump’s renewed bravado and China’s call for free trade, the real action happened behind closed doors. In a series of quiet but consequential moves, Washington struck or initiated bilateral trade agreements with four ASEAN countries: Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Each deal offered selective access to the vast U.S. market in exchange for far-reaching concessions. Collectively, they reveal how Trump’s transactional diplomacy is reshaping Southeast Asia’s economic landscape and testing the region’s unity.
Malaysia’s unequal bargain
Malaysia was among the first to sign what the U.S. calls a “reciprocal trade agreement.” The deal obliges Kuala Lumpur to keep rare-earth magnets flowing freely to American companies and to fast-track partnerships with U.S. firms in its critical minerals sector. Malaysia holds more than 16 million tons of rare earth deposits, supplying about 13% of global demand. Yet despite this leverage, the agreement fixes a 19% tariff on Malaysian exports to the U.S., while roughly 60 percent of its other goods—from semiconductors to palm oil—remain duty-free.
Perhaps most strikingly, Malaysia agreed to let Washington review its participation in future digital trade agreements that might “jeopardize essential U.S. interests.” In practice, this could mean U.S. oversight over Malaysia’s data and digital policies—a significant loss of policy independence for a country that has long sought to balance its ties between China and the West.
Cambodia’s total concession
Cambodia’s deal went even further. Phnom Penh agreed to eliminate tariffs on all U.S. imports, while the U.S. maintained its 19% levy on Cambodian goods. It also ceded regulatory ground—accepting U.S. food safety standards and certifications. This effectively allows American agencies to oversee what enters Cambodian markets. The U.S. currently runs a $12.3 billion trade deficit with Cambodia, and Washington hopes this deal will narrow the gap—largely by flooding Cambodian shelves with U.S. products.
Preferential Access, Selective Reciprocity
Thailand and Vietnam, meanwhile, have outlined frameworks for future trade talks that mirror this “reciprocal” but asymmetric logic. Thailand agreed to scrap tariffs on 99% of U.S. goods, relax foreign ownership rules in telecommunications, and purchase $18.8 billion worth of U.S. aircraft, plus billions more in energy imports. Vietnam pledged to boost annual U.S. agricultural imports by $2.9 billion, with tariffs on its own exports cut from 46 percent to 20 percent—and possibly lower later.
For Washington, these bilateral wins fit neatly into Trump’s long-standing narrative: opening doors for American exporters while keeping competitors on a tight leash. But for ASEAN members, the price of access may be rising sovereignty costs.
Protecting U.S. markets, weakening others’ autonomy
A former Malaysian trade minister warned that the new deal “forces Malaysia to relinquish control over its economy while the U.S. retains full policy freedom.” Indeed, one clause in Malaysia’s agreement obliges it to comply with U.S. trade sanctions against third countries—a measure that could undermine Kuala Lumpur’s neutrality and risk retaliation from partners like China.
The Philippines left out
The Philippines, meanwhile, finds itself watching from the sidelines. The Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry voiced frustration that Manila has not secured a similar deal, leaving its semiconductor and BPO sectors exposed.
The stakes are high: Trump has threatened to impose 100% tariffs on semiconductor imports and is pushing for the “Keep Call Centers in America Act of 2025,” which would penalize companies outsourcing to countries like the Philippines.
If passed, U.S. firms that move call centers abroad could lose access to federal loans and face monthly fines equal to 8.3% of their public funding—making outsourcing far less attractive.
The Philippine government later clarified that it was not left out of the US’ latest zero tariff dealings at the ASEAN Summit. Instead, it chose to opt out to protect key domestic sectors from being fully opened to foreign competition, an official from Manila said.
Special Assistant to the President for Investment and Economic Affairs Frederick Go said the Marcos administration chose to prioritize food security and local producers over rapid market liberalization.
A race to the bottom
The pattern is clear: ASEAN countries are competing against one another for favor with Washington, each offering deeper concessions to avoid being left behind. This “race to the bottom” risks weakening regional labor and environmental protections while deepening dependency on U.S. markets. Rather than strengthening ASEAN as a collective economic bloc, Trump’s unilateral deals are fragmenting it—turning what could have been a coordinated negotiating front into a patchwork of one-sided arrangements.
The trade deals with the four ASEAN countries paves the way for US products to access ASEAN markets unhampered, particularly in agricultural goods, energy, aviation, and critical minerals.
Allowing US goods easier access is a real threat to ASEAN’s domestic industries, particularly the agriculture sector, which is already being affected by reduced US tariffs.
The case for ASEAN unity
The only sustainable response, analysts say, is for ASEAN to act as one. By setting common trade standards, coordinating policies, and negotiating as a bloc, member-states can resist being pitted against one another. Otherwise, Trump’s strategy of “divide and deal” could leave Southeast Asia more vulnerable—economically dependent and politically constrained—just as global power competition is heating up again.
Jayson Cainglet is the current Executive Director at Samahang Industriya ng Agrikultura (SINAG), a Philippine agricultural group that advocates for the improvement and development of the country’s livestock, poultry, and dairy industries. Cainglet is actively involved in advocating for the interests of Filipino farmers and the agricultural industry, including addressing issues such as budget increases for the National Food Authority (NFA) and industry policies.
Factum is an Asia-Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk
The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organizations.
