Shaheen Abdul Gani and Salma Razick
For much of the post-Cold War era, international conflict resolution was largely a Western enterprise. The United States, its allies and the United Nations remained the principal brokers of peace, from the Camp David Accords to the Dayton Agreement, relying on diplomatic influence, economic leverage and security guarantees.
Today, however, that landscape is changing. As geopolitical competition intensifies and Western governments become more deeply involved in major conflicts, through direct participation or support for allies, they are increasingly viewed not as impartial mediators but as parties with vested interests. The result has been the emergence of a more diverse set of diplomatic actors, with regional and middle powers such as Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia taking on mediation roles.
Pakistan is among the latest to join this group. Amid rising tensions between the United States, Israel, and Iran, Islamabad has positioned itself as a diplomatic channel between Washington and Tehran. Its efforts reflect a broader transformation in conflict diplomacy. Mediation is no longer concentrated in a handful of Western capitals but is increasingly undertaken by states whose regional influence, strategic relationships, and perceived neutrality allow them to engage in ways that traditional mediators cannot.
How Pakistan Became the U.S.-Iran War’s Unlikely Mediator
Weeks after the war began, Pakistan confirmed it was relaying messages between Iran and the United States. This is a stark contrast for a country that President Trump accused of “lies and deceit” during his first term. How did this come about?
The answer lies largely in Pakistan’s unusually broad diplomatic reach. Islamabad maintains working relationships not only with Washington and Tehran, but also with Beijing and the Gulf capitals, an advantage few other states in the region can claim.
Pakistan has kept functional channels with Iran’s leadership, strengthened during the 12-day Iran-Israel war, when Islamabad condemned the Israeli strikes as violations of international law. President Masoud Pezeshkian later thanked Pakistan for its support. Its credibility in Tehran was further helped by the fact that, despite functional relations with Washington, it hosts no U.S. military bases. After Operation Epic Fury, it was also the only state in the region to publicly condemn the U.S. strikes on Iran.
Pakistan’s renewed importance to Washington stems from two recent developments. The first was Pakistan’s role in the arrest and transfer of Mohammed Sharifullah, the alleged mastermind behind the Kabul airport bombing in 2021. Acting on CIA intelligence, Pakistan’s military facilitated the operation, earning public praise from President Trump. The second turning point came in the aftermath of India’s Operation Sindoor and Pakistan’s retaliatory Operation Bunyan al-Marsous. While demonstrating military preparedness, Islamabad also projected itself as a responsible actor capable of restraint, helping to de-escalate a crisis that carried the risk of escalation.
Beyond its ties with Tehran and Washington, Pakistan’s mediation efforts have also benefited from regional backing. Meetings in Islamabad involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and other regional actors demonstrated that Pakistan was operating within a broader coalition seeking de-escalation with states that have direct stakes in the conflict.
China’s support has further strengthened Pakistan’s position. As a major importer of West Asian energy, Beijing has a strong interest in preventing instability in the Gulf and disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Following consultations in Islamabad, Pakistan and China jointly proposed a five-point initiative calling for a ceasefire, renewed dialogue, and respect for sovereignty and international law. Beijing’s support also significantly illustrates Pakistan’s unique diplomatic utility. Although Islamabad’s close ties with China have often complicated its relationship with Washington, in this instance they enhanced Pakistan’s ability to engage both major powers simultaneously.
Pakistan’s role in the crisis cannot be explained by diplomatic positioning alone. While mediation has undoubtedly elevated Islamabad’s international profile, it also has strategic reasons to prevent a prolonged conflict. Unlike many external powers, Pakistan would bear significant economic and security costs from continued instability between the United States, Israel, and Iran.
Economically, Pakistan remains closely tied to the Gulf through energy imports, trade, and remittances. Prolonged disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz or sustained increases in energy prices would place additional pressure on its economy. At the same time, instability in Iran poses direct security risks. The two countries share a long border, and any deterioration in Iran’s internal security could have spillover effects in Balochistan , in the country’s southern region.
While it would be premature to credit Pakistan alone for the ceasefire and subsequent memorandum of understanding (MoU), its mediation helped create the space for dialogue between Washington and Tehran. Although tensions have since escalated and the MoU has collapsed, these developments do not diminish the significance of Pakistan’s role. Islamabad demonstrated that it possesses both diplomatic access and political credibility to serve as an intermediary between adversaries.
Before the Middle Powers: The West’s Role in Conflict Resolution
Western powers have historically demonstrated that they can mediate even the most entrenched conflict, justifying their mediating role on claims of neutrality and impartiality. This involvement in conflict resolution is vast and spans decades.
At its most effective, Western mediation has resolved some of the 20th century’s most intense conflicts. The Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement of 1998 ended 30 years of conflict in Northern Ireland, following multi-party talks chaired by U.S. envoy George Mitchell. In 1978, the United States brokered talks between Egypt and Israel at Camp David that produced a peace treaty the following year, ending 30 years of hostility. Yet this involvement or mediation has coexisted with a pattern of selective or insufficient action. A case in point: in 1994 Rwanda, despite clear warning signs of the genocide that was to come, UN troops withdrew on orders from New York. Troops from France, Italy and Belgium moved quickly, but only to evacuate foreigners. Soon after, Belgium pulled its troops from the United Nations Peacekeeping Force following the killing of ten Belgian peacekeepers, further hollowing out the international presence on the ground. Additionally, in 1995 Bosnia, the ‘Srebrenica Massacre’ claimed more than 8,000 lives, mainly Bosnian Muslim boys and men, and displaced over 25,000 women, children and elderly. The 1993 demilitarization agreement, combined with the delayed, downgraded, or outright refusal of NATO air strike support, and a pattern of political hesitancy among Western powers, contributed to the conditions that enabled the Srebrenica massacre to occur.
This brought a new wave of criticism of Western mediation. Most peacekeeping frameworks had always been shaped by the foreign policy interests of the states directing them. There was also a striking, deliberate silence around conflicts that offered no such returns, despite crippling human rights violations.
9/11 and the declaration of the ‘War on Terror’ marked a shift, where the United States that was long positioned as an arbiter of global conflict, now openly pursued its strategic interests. This shift unraveled the framework of Western intervention. Long justified under the banner of conflict resolution to maintain global peace, were mostly interventions shaped by foreign policy interests that served specific actors. While this revelation wasn’t new, the war on terror emphasized it to the point that it was impossible to ignore.
Against this backdrop of eroded credibility and an increasingly inward-looking EU foreign policy, momentum has gathered for middle powers to take on the role of mediators.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s emergence as a mediator does not mean that it has resolved one of West Asia’s most volatile rivalries. Iran’s decision to suspend the MoU and withdraw its delegation from talks in Switzerland following President Trump’s renewed threat of military action underscores how fragile the diplomatic process remains. Yet the significance of Pakistan’s role lies less in securing a breakthrough than in achieving what few states were able to do: bringing Washington and Tehran to the negotiating table.
That alone reflects a transformation in international conflict diplomacy. As trust in traditional Western mediators continues to erode and geopolitical competition deepens, regional and middle powers are stepping into roles once dominated by Washington and its allies. Pakistan’s intervention demonstrates that influence in mediation is no longer determined solely by military or economic power, but by the ability to maintain credible relationships across competing blocs. Whether Islamabad can sustain this role remains to be seen. But its emergence as a diplomatic bridge between the United States and Iran suggests that the future of international mediation will be shaped by a far wider cast of actors than in the post-Cold War era.
Author Bios
Shaheen Abdul Gani is a Research Assistant at Arutha Research. Her work focuses on China-Sri Lanka debt relations and Sri Lankan macroeconomic policy, particularly in the context of the country’s 2022 economic crisis. Her broader research interests include green finance and social protection. She holds a BA (Hons) in International Relations from the University of Nottingham.
Salma Razick is a Communications Specialist (Consultant) at Arutha Research. Her work bridges strategic communications, monitoring and evaluation (MEL), and research across governance and digital rights. She holds a BSc in International Development from the University of London (International Programmes) and an MA in Media, Data and Society from the University of Liverpool.
Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank/consultancy on Diplomacy, Tech-Plomacy, Digital and Energy Futures accessible via www.factum.lk.
The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.
