By Shiran Illanperuma
For Venezuelans, the new year began with the US illegally bombing its civilian infrastructure and kidnapping democratically elected President Nicholas Maduro and First Lady Cillian Flores.
Hours before the attack, President Maduro met with a Chinese delegation sent by President Xi Jinping. This delegation included Special Envoy for Latin America and the Caribbean Qiu Xiaoqi, Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Latin America and the Caribbean Liu Bo, Deputy Director of the same department Wang Hao, among others. After the meeting, Maduro posted a message on social media stating “We reaffirm our commitment to the strategic relationship that advances and strengthens in various areas for the construction of the world #Multipolar of development and peace.”
It is unclear where the delegation was at the time of the attack, and there is no news of any diplomat being harmed, yet the timing could be interpreted as a snub to China (it is worth recalling that during the 1999 NATO assault on Yugoslavia, the US bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade killing three people and injuring 27). The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has condemned the attack on Venezuela and called on the US to “abide by international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and stop violating other countries’ sovereignty and security”.
This attack on Venezuela, in the presence of high-level Chinese diplomats, has raised concerns about the viability of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Latin America and the fate of commercial relations between China and the region.
The Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine
The attack on Venezuela has nothing to do with the country’s relations with China per se. US animosity to the Bolivarian process goes back to the nationalisation of oil by President Hugo Chavez in 2001, and his use of oil rents to advance social programmes and regional integration.
However, the latest assault on Venezuela also needs to be understood in the context of the US National Security Strategy 2025, which states that the US will not allow “non-Hemispheric competitors” (an obvious reference to China, and possibly Russia) to “own or control strategically vital assets” in the region.
The strategy proposes “closer collaboration between the US government and the American private sector” on investment and acquisition opportunities, and envisions a three-pronged approach to disciplining Latin America and pushing ‘competitors’ out:
- New Mercantilism – Using mercantilist tools like tariffs and access to the US market to pursue geopolitical interests.
- Militarization – Readjusting US military presence in the region and improving military interoperability through weapons sales and intelligence sharing.
- Old Neoliberalism – Imposing an extreme version of neoliberalism on regional governments by pushing back against efforts to tax, regulate, or expropriate US businesses.
In this context, the attack on Venezuela may serve as a kind of warning shot to governments across the region – a reminder of US power and its ability to get what it wants through military means.
The Future of the BRI in Latin America
So, what does this mean for Latin American economic relations with China, including the BRI? Certainly, the attack on Venezuela will have a cooling effect on Latin American engagement with China, but a few realties need to be understood in the long term.
First, bilateral trade between Latin America and China has more than doubled in the last decade, growing from $235.9 billion in 2015 to $518.47 billion in 2024. China is Latin America’s second largest trading partner and the largest for countries like Brazil and Argentina. The US, lacking China’s vast industrial chain, is incapable of replacing China as a source of demand for Latin American exports. At the same time, it cannot reduce Latin American commerce with China by fiat without inducing a severe economic shock to the region, which in turn would trigger a wave of migration.
Second, China is not the largest investor in Latin America, but it is a strategically important one. The ‘China option’ has emboldened governments to engage in ‘resource nationalism’ – only Chinese firms, particularly SOEs, have been willing to work with governments who wish to maintain national ownership and enforce domestic value addition of natural resources (Chinese investment in Bolivia’s lithium is a classic example). Moreover, China’s leadership in emerging technologies makes it a critical partner for upgrading infrastructure, from Brazil’s green transition (90% of the country’s solar panels are imported from China) to the development of ports in Peru. By comparison, the US strategy is to help private corporations acquire and collect rent from Latin American natural monopolies. This simultaneously forecloses the possibility of investment in downstream value addition and denies state’s tax revenue which could be used for social programmes and economic diversification.
Third, for the above reasons, even the most right-wing and pro-US governments in Latin America have been compelled to maintain financial and commercial relations with China. Argentinian President Javier Milei and former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro were both forced to tone down their anti-China rhetoric after coming to power. Milei renewed a $5 billion currency swap with China while Bolsonaro sought to maintain Brazilian agricultural exports. The reality is that even ideologically committed US partners are unable to break commercial ties with China without harming their domestic economic interests.
The Trump administration has scored a victory early in 2026. But optics aside, the abduction of Maduro does not automatically mean the collapse of the Venezuelan government and the Bolivarian process. The social base of Maduro’s party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, remains strong, with a loyal military and armed popular militias. It is still not clear how the Trump administration will carve out control of Venezuela’s oil infrastructure without getting bogged down in a costly guerilla war.
The US attack on Venezuela and abduction of Maduro has certainly dealt a blow to the BRI in Latin America. But it is far too early to declare the BRI in the region to be dead. Regional governments and leaders may reconsider ongoing and future projects in light of US threats and aggression. However, it will be much harder (and more painful) to adjust Latin America’s trade with China, which forms the real basis for BRI engagement. In the longer term, any government in this region where 89 million people – or one in seven people – live in poverty, has to also deal with the necessity for productive investment and technological upgrading.
Shiran Illanperuma is a Sri Lankan journalist and political economist. He is a researcher at Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research and a co-editor of Wenhua Zongheng: A Journal of Contemporary Chinese Thought.
Factum is an Asia-Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk
The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organizations.
