By Kividi Koralage
The Indo-Pacific region is an expansive and strategically significant area that stretches from the eastern coast of Africa, across the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean, and extends to the western and central Pacific Ocean.
This region encompasses a diverse array of countries, including those in East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania, and parts of Africa. The key players of this region include major economies like India, Japan, China, Australia, and the United States, along with a host of smaller yet strategically and economic powerhouses within ASEAN.
The Indo-Pacific region plays a central role as approximately 60 percent of the globe’s maritime trade, including vital energy supplies, passes through the waters of Indo Pacific. These sea lanes are the arteries of the global economy linking market across Asia, Europe and the Americas.
As the world navigates towards a multipolar world order, the Indo-Pacific region has emerged as the epicentre of geopolitical competition. The economic and strategic weight of the world increasingly shift towards the region.
China’s economic and military rise has been a key driver of this shift, with Beijing seeking to assert its influence across the region and particularly through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and its expanding naval presence.
The “Blue Dragon” strategy describes China’s comprehensive and multifaceted approach to expanding its influence and securing strategic dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. This strategy involves leveraging military power, economic initiatives, and geopolitical maneuvers across key maritime and territorial frontiers.
China applies pressure on Taiwan and asserts its claims in the East China Sea through military exercises and the deployment of naval and air forces. The goal is to project power, normalize its territorial claims, and challenge US and Japanese influence in the region.
By constructing and militarizing artificial islands, China strengthens its control over the South China Sea, a critical waterway for global trade. Despite international legal challenges, Beijing continues to assert its “nine-dash line” claims, aiming to dominate the region’s resources and strategic routes.
China controls the headwaters of major rivers like the Brahmaputra and Mekong, giving it leverage over downstream countries. Through dam construction and water management, Beijing can influence agricultural and economic conditions in South and Southeast Asia, using water as a tool of geopolitical pressure.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a central pillar of China’s economic strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. Launched in 2013, the BRI aims to enhance global connectivity through an expansive network of infrastructure projects, including roads, railways, ports, and pipelines.
Within the Indo-Pacific, the Maritime Silk Road a key component of the BRI plays a crucial role. This initiative seeks to develop and connect major ports across the Indo-Pacific, from Southeast Asia to the Middle East and East Africa, thereby enhancing China’s trade routes and access to markets.
Key projects under the Maritime Silk Road include the development of deep-sea ports like Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar.
These ports are strategically located near critical maritime chokepoints, allowing China to secure vital sea lanes and project its influence across the region. Additionally, these infrastructure projects often come with financial investments, loans, and development assistance from China, which strengthens its economic ties with recipient countries.
China’s economic presence in the Indo-Pacific is significant and multifaceted, encompassing trade, investment, and development assistance. As the world’s second-largest economy and a major global trading power, China has cultivated deep trade relationships with Indo-Pacific countries, particularly within ASEAN.
ASEAN as a bloc is one of China’s largest trading partners, with trade volumes surpassing USD 800 billion in recent years. This trade relationship is bolstered by China’s participation in regional trade agreements, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes 15 IndoPacific countries and is one of the largest free trade agreements in the world.
Beyond trade, China is also a major investor in the region’s infrastructure, particularly in transport, energy, and telecommunications. Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private companies have undertaken numerous large-scale projects across the Indo-Pacific, from building railways in Southeast Asia to developing energy infrastructure in Central Asia.
These investments are not only economically beneficial for the recipient countries but also serve China’s strategic interests by increasing its influence and securing its supply chains.
Securing sea lanes is another critical aspect of China’s economic strategy in the Indo-Pacific. The region’s waterways, particularly the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, are vital for China’s trade and energy imports.
Approximately 80 percent of China’s crude oil imports pass through the Strait of Malacca, making the security of these sea lanes a top priority for Beijing. To this end, China has invested heavily in developing port infrastructure along these routes, creating a network of strategic “pearls” that enhance its ability to protect and control these crucial maritime arteries.
China’s pursuit of natural resources in the Indo-Pacific is a key driver of its economic and security policies. The region is rich in resources that are essential to China’s economic growth and technological development, including energy resources, fisheries, and rare earth minerals.
The Indo-Pacific is a major source of energy resources for China, particularly oil and natural gas from the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. China has invested in oil and gas exploration and production in countries like Myanmar, Iran, and Iraq, and has constructed pipelines and energy terminals to secure these supplies.
The China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines, for example, provide a critical alternative route for China’s energy imports, bypassing the strategic chokepoint of the Strait of Malacca.
The South China Sea is a focal point of China’s military strategy in the Indo-Pacific. Over the past decade, China has undertaken land reclamation projects in the South China Sea, constructing artificial islands on reefs and atolls within the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands.
These islands have been equipped with military facilities, including runways, hangars, radar installations, and missile systems. China aims to assert territorial claims over nearly the entire South China Sea, which it bases on its controversial “nine-dash line” claim.
China’s rapid naval modernization and the expansion of its blue-water navy are central to its strategy of securing its interests in the Indo-Pacific. Over the past two decades, it has transformed its navy from a coastal defence force into a formidable blue-water navy capable of operating far from its shores. This transformation includes the development of advanced warships, submarines, aircraft carriers, and amphibious assault ships.
The expansion of China’s navy, particularly its carrier strike groups, enables Beijing to project power across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. This is essential for supporting China’s broader strategic goals, including deterring potential adversaries, asserting its territorial claims, and protecting its overseas interests.
China’s submarine fleet, which includes both conventional and nuclear-powered submarines, is a key component of its strategic deterrence strategy. These submarines are capable of launching ballistic missiles, providing China with a second-strike capability in the event of a nuclear conflict. The deployment of these assets in the Indo-Pacific enhances China’s ability to deter potential adversaries and defend its national interests.
China’s partnership with Pakistan is one of the most significant in the Indo-Pacific. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship BRI project, has deepened economic and military ties between the two countries. China has provided Pakistan with advanced military equipment, including fighter jets, naval vessels, and missile systems.
The development of the Gwadar port, which is strategically located near the Strait of Hormuz, enhances China’s access to the Arabian Sea and provides a potential naval base for its operations in the Indian Ocean.
Cambodia has emerged as a key partner for China in Southeast Asia. In recent years, China has provided Cambodia with substantial military aid and infrastructure investments, including the construction of a naval base at Ream. Located on the Gulf of Thailand, this has raised concerns about China’s intentions in the region and its potential use as a military outpost for China’s navy.
China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti, located at the entrance to the Red Sea, underscores its strategic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. The base supports China’s naval operations in the Indian Ocean and protects its interests along the Maritime Silk Road. It also provides China with a foothold in the strategically important Horn of Africa, where it can influence regional security dynamics.
China’s strategic interest in the Indo-Pacific is intertwined with its broader ambitions for economic, military and geopolitical dominance. Through initiatives like the BRI, the militarization of the South China Sea, and the expansion of its naval capabilities, China seeks to secure its economic lifelines, assert its territorial claims and enhance its influence across the region.
The Indo-Pacific has thus emerged as a critical arena of geopolitical competition, where the future balance of power and stability of the global economy will be determined. As this strategic contest unfolds, the region’s smaller nations will need to navigate carefully, balancing relationships between China and rest of world to protect their own interests in an increasingly complex and competitive environment.
Kividi Koralage is a graduate of ECU Sri Lanka majoring in International Business. She is currently reading for her LLB and following an international relations program at the University of Aberystwyth in the UK. She is also a CIMA passed finalist and a past student of the BCIS in Colombo. She can be reached at kivikoralage345@gmail.com.
Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.
The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.
