By Lasanda Kurukulasuriya
In a recent speech at the National Defence College, President Ranil Wickremesinghe made comments on the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, some of which throw light on aspects of his approach to foreign policy – and others that point to some grey areas.
“The geopolitics of the Indian Ocean has unfortunately made us the punching bag for Hambantota,” the president said, at the first graduation ceremony of the college held 14th Sept. in Colombo. He was referring to heightened diplomatic tensions that broke out over the Chinese research ship Yuan Wang 5’s visit to Hambantota port. India and the US sought to exercise pressure to reverse approval given for the vessel to enter, and China reacted adversely. Urgent consultations were held with the president and, we are told, as no clear reasons were given for objections, the ship was allowed to dock. Referencing this incident, the president went on talk about the subject of “what our position is in the Indian Ocean.”
The Indian Ocean is different
Significantly, he challenged the concept of the ‘Indo Pacific’ widely propagated by the US, saying that the Indian Ocean is different from the Pacific Ocean. Noting that there are many definitions of ‘Indo Pacific,’ he said “As far as Sri Lanka is concerned, we accept the definition of ASEAN that these are two separate oceans joined together.” He added “We do not want the tension in the Pacific to flow over here. It’s not only us. ASEAN doesn’t want it. They don’t want it to come beyond the South China Sea. So we are with ASEAN on that.”
Hambantota is a not a military port but a commercial port, he categorically stated. While Sri Lankan armed forces had a presence there, “They only ensure that this is a commercial port and no less,” he said, adding that “it shows our strategic importance that many people sort of come to conclusions which are unwarranted.” In an aside, no doubt intended for big powers involved in the recent tug-of-war over Hambantota, he said that the biggest tension in the region comes from the Himalayas, where two nuclear powers face each other. “Secondly, it comes from the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea where bases are being established and militarization is going on. In fact, all those who are militarizing the Horn of Africa, point to us who have not militarized anything, and they say we are the ones who are doing it” he said. “So this is the irony of life and the irony of being a small nation.” Noting the large volumes of energy supplies and shipping passing through the Indian Ocean, he stated that Sri Lanka does not want to see conflict or big power rivalry here. “That’s one thing we can’t afford.”
In an interview with India’s StratNews Global on Monday (26), Wickremesinghe elaborated further on the geopolitics of the two oceans: “We are not the same but we have to work together” he told Nitin Gokhale. “For time immemorial China has been coming into the Indian Ocean, and ships from Arabia and India have been going to China. And this influence of both have spread… So when we call the Indo Pacific, accept the reality that there are two different systems.”
Not taking sides
In his speech at the NDC, the president asserted that Sri Lanka will not join any big power or take sides in such rivalry. This is where the position that is being outlined becomes somewhat problematic. How is the task of achieving such a balance to be accomplished in the throes of an economic crisis, with the country at the mercy of the very powers that are intensely competing for strategic advantage? In March, before Sri Lanka secured a $1 billion Indian credit line for desperately needed supplies, it was reported that approval was given (by the previous government) for a number of security-related agreements with India, and concerns were expressed that national security could be compromised.
“… we are of the view that in looking after the security of Sri Lanka that we must also ensure that nothing adverse happens to the security of India,” the president said, according to the President’s Media Division transcript. “That we have been committed to, and we will go ahead with it. There will be no movement out of it.”
While the omnipresence of ‘big brother’ India in foreign policy formulation is nothing new, the remarks that followed do raise some questions, given the stated position that Sri Lanka ‘will not take sides in big power rivalry.’ The president said “And certainly, our security. That’s why we work with India on the Colombo conclave, on the trilateral security arrangements and many other fields, especially outside the military field of piracy, of human trafficking, of drugs.”
The president would be referring here to the ‘Colombo Security Conclave’ (CSC), a seemingly Indian-led initiative, which sees high ranking defence officials from Sri Lanka, India and the Maldives meet periodically. Cooperation on maritime security is its main focus, also extending into intelligence sharing. Last year its secretariat was established at the Naval headquarters in Colombo. At this year’s confab in March, Mauritius attended as its newest member. Bangladesh and Seychelles were observers.
India and US
It turns out, the contours of such an entity were outlined in a secret US document declassified in January last year, which had the objective of counterbalancing China. The 2018 report titled ‘US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific’ lists among others, the objective to “Accelerate India’s rise and capacity to serve as a net provider of security and Major Defense Partner,” and to “Strengthen the capacity of emerging partners in South Asia, including Maldives, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, to contribute to a free and open order.” In February that year the Maldives, to the consternation of its ruling party MPs, signed a maritime security agreement with India, allowing it to station troops on the island of Uthuru Thilafalhu.
The CSC’s objectives of countering terrorism, drugs, arms and human trafficking, money laundering etc. are no doubt important, and would require a regionally coordinated approach. The question is whether Sri Lanka is unwittingly being drawn into an exercise that is part of a broader strategy by allied big powers, to counter the threat they perceive from China. If this is the case, would it not run counter to the president’s stated goal of ‘not taking sides’ in big power rivalry? Could it potentially lead to conflict in the Indian Ocean, which the president emphatically said we do not want?
While Quad member India is designated a ‘major defence partner’ of the US, this does not mean that it toes the US line on everything. India exercises ‘strategic autonomy,’ as seen in its defence relationship with Russia, and its import of Russian oil despite US sanctions over Ukraine. The relationship with China however went downhill after clashes on the border of Ladakh in 2020. There was no bilateral meeting between the two leaders during the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Uzbekistan.
Looking at the bigger picture, analysts point to a robust trade relationship between the two Asian giants, and statements from their leaders that show awareness of the importance of resolving their disputes. Be that as it may, the vagaries of the Indo-China relationship would seem to have a direct bearing on India’s strategic calculations in its neighbourhood. It would be safe to surmise that peace on those borders will greatly improve the prospects for a conflict-free Indian Ocean.
Lasanda Kurukulasuriya is an independent Colombo-based journalist with an interest in geopolitics.
Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.
